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Post-communist Welfare Capitalisms: 
Bringing Institutions and Political Agency Back In 
 
Abstract: 
This article explores the post-communist worlds of welfare capitalism in Central, Eastern 
and South Eastern Europe, including the successor states of the former Soviet Union. It 
discusses recent developments, whilst offering some additional theoretical reflections on 
the key factors that have shaped welfare state change over time. The text explores key 
institutional features characterising these worlds of welfare capitalism in transition. In order 
to highlight the actions of political elites in the market, we discuss the notions of “state-
enabled”, “state-influenced” and “state-interfered” market economies. In this article, we 
introduce the term “captured welfare systems” to refer to the ways in which some states 
and political elites interfere in the market in order to capture resources. In the conclusion, 
we move beyond classical approaches to institutional change based on path-dependency 
and lock-in arguments, drawing attention to the importance of bringing institutions and 
political agency back into the analysis of welfare and its transformations. 
 
Keywords: political economy of welfare capitalism, captured welfare system, Central and 
Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union 
JEL classification: D60, D72, H53, I38, P20, P30 
 
 
Postkomunistièki socijalni kapitalizam: 
ponovno razmatranje utjecaja institucija i politièkog djelovanja 
 
Saetak: 
U radu se istrauje postkomunistièki svijet socijalnog kapitalizma u Srednjoj, Istoènoj i 
Jugoistoènoj Europi, ukljuèujuæi drave sljednice Sovjetskog Saveza. Razmatraju se novija 
dogaðanja, uz teorijski osvrt na kljuène èimbenike koji su utjecali na promjene socijalne 
drave tijekom vremena. Istrauju se kljuène institucionalne znaèajke socijalnog kapitalizma 
tijekom tranzicije. Kako bismo naglasili djelovanje politièkih elita na trištu, razmatramo 
pojmove „trišna ekonomija koju omoguæuje drava“, „trišna ekonomija pod dravnim 
utjecajem“ i „trišna ekonomija koju karakterizira upletanje drave“. U radu se uvodi pojam 
„zarobljene socijalne politike“ što se odnosi na naèine na koji se neke drave i politièke 
elite ukljuèuju na trište kako bi prisvojili resurse. U zakljuèku se odmièemo od klasiènih 
pristupa institucionalnim promjenama koji naglašavaju utjecaj povijesnog nasljeða – u 
smislu ovisnosti o prijeðenom putu (path dependency) ili uhodanih naèina odluèivanja 
(lock-in) – te ukazujemo na vanost ponovnog uvoðenja institucija i politièkog djelovanja 
(political agency) u analizu socijalnih politika i njihovih transformacija. 
 
Kljuène rijeèi: politièka ekonomija socijalnog kapitalizma, zarobljena socijalna politika, 
Srednja i Istoèna Europa, Jugoistoèna Europa, bivši Sovjetski Savez 
JEL klasifikacija: D60, D72, H53, I38, P20, P30 
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1 Introduction 
 
This article explores the post-communist worlds of welfare capitalism in Central, Eastern 
and South Eastern Europe, including the successor states of the former Soviet Union. It 
discusses recent developments, offering additional reflections on the key factors that have 
shaped welfare state change. The article moves away from a simple classification of political 
economy models and welfare regimes, examining the role that state and state-like actions, 
primarily those of international actors, play in welfare state building. 
 
We discuss the key institutional features that characterise these worlds of welfare capitalism 
in transition, analysing their strengths and weaknesses in terms of social protection. In the 
process, we move beyond classical approaches to institutional change based on path-
dependency and lock-in arguments (see North, 1990; Pierson, 1998; Streeck and Thelen, 
2005), drawing attention to the importance of political agency in welfare transformations.1 
Highlighting the actions of political elites in the market, we discuss notions of “state-
enabled”, “state-influenced” and “state-interfered” market economies (see Schmidt, 2009). 
We also introduce the notion of “captured welfare systems” in terms of the ways in which, 
in some settings, political elites capture and redistribute resources along clientelistic 
principles. It is in and through the complex combination of these factors, we suggest, that 
the welfare architecture of countries in transition is constructed.  
 
Whilst surveying the region as a whole, we focus in particular on twenty-one countries, 
grouped into a number of sub-regions: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia for 
Central Europe; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for the Baltic States; Bulgaria and Romania 
for South Eastern Europe/EU; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia for 
South Eastern Europe/non-EU; and Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine and Uzbekistan for the former Soviet Union. The 
need for the inclusion of such a wide spectrum of case studies is dictated by the necessity of 
exploring similarities and differences in a highly diversified region. In fact, whilst these 
countries all share a communist past, many are new nation states emerging from the break-
up of the Yugoslav and Soviet federal states, having, over time, developed important 
differences in terms of political functioning, nature of the economy and welfare regime 
development. 
 
The paper seeks to complement a growing contemporary literature on political economy 
(see Bohle and Greskovits, 2007; Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007; Lane and Myant, 
2007; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2010) with emerging 
research on welfare states in transition (see Aidukaite, 2006, 2009, 2010; Cerami, 2006; 
Deacon and Stubbs, 2007; Inglot, 2008). In line with Cook (2007, 2010a, 2010b) and 
Haggard and Kaufman (2008), we argue that political economy matters, but that there is a 
need, within this, to explore the role of political elites in the development of welfare 
                                                 
1 For recent similar calls, see Mahoney and Thelen (2009) and Schmidt (2010). 
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regimes. In this way, we move beyond the formalistic propositions of some political 
economy models, arguing that the study of elite capture of resources is crucial to 
understand how contemporary welfare regimes are organised in parts of the region. Tracing 
elite capture through distortions in both mechanisms of coordination and the 
redistribution of resources, forms a key link between political economy, political agency 
and welfare regime type. Distortions can occur in the acquisition of rights and privileges, 
and in the redistribution of benefits and entitlements, subsequently altering the patterns of 
institutional change. Our focus on the post-communist world builds on existing theories of 
institutional evolution (see Cerami and Vanhuysse, 2009; Streeck, 2009; Steinmo, 2010) 
which look not only at institutional settings, but also at institution-shaping politics and 
processes of contention (see Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). 
 
The article first explores, in Part Two, recent literature on the political economy of social 
policy and on varieties of capitalism. In Part Three, it then examines the diverse varieties of 
capitalism and welfare regime types that are emerging in transition countries, paying 
attention to the role of the state and state-like actions. Part Four investigates the complex 
evolution of welfare institutions, examining issues related to the collection and 
redistribution of resources, framed in terms of elite capture. A concluding section returns to 
our central argument on the importance of bringing institutions and political agency back 
into the analysis of welfare and its transformations.  
 
 
2 The Political Economy of Social Policy  
and Varieties of Capitalism Approaches 
 
Crucially, political economy analysis is more than just adding together studies of political 
and economic processes and, instead, is concerned with understanding sets of structural 
and institutional dynamics which have a strong influence on development outcomes. Stated 
simply, “political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and 
economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different 
groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these 
relationships over time” (Collinson, 2003: 10). A political economy approach aids 
understanding of the factors which impede or impel the introduction of policies to reduce 
poverty and social exclusion, through a better comprehension of the main drivers of 
institutional evolution. The approach presented here, in broad brush-stroke terms, moves 
beyond both rational-choice institutionalist theory (Shepsle, 1986; Fiorina, 1995; Bates, de 
Figueredo and Weingast, 1998; Weingast, 1998) and historical institutionalism (Hall, 
1986; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; Skocpol, 1995; Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Thelen, 1999, 2004; North, 1990; Pierson, 2000), towards a rather eclectic mixture of 
sociological, actor-centred and, particularly, discursive institutionalism (March and Olsen, 
1989; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Brinton and Nee, 1998; Scharpf, 1997; Schludi, 2005; 
Schmidt, 2006, 2008). Whatever the boundary disputes between these theories are, recent 
attempts to re-emphasise the role of agency (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009), and the 
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interplay between ideas, discourses and agency (Schmidt, 2010), appear to offer a useful 
synthesis, utilised here to a large extent. 
 
In general terms, a new political economy of social policy within social science needs to 
examine the drivers of economic and social progress, bringing political agency back in. 
Moving beyond deterministic economic analysis, this renewed emphasis on forms of 
coordination of the economic sphere gives particular attention to the state and to state-like 
actions, including the activities of a range of transnational actors which are increasingly 
recognised as significant in transition contexts. This approach examines patterns of political 
decision-making, including the role of interests, conflict and coalitions (Hancké, Rhodes 
and Thatcher, 2007), and struggles based on particular structures and forces including 
class, gender and “ethnicity” (Ost, 2005). The study of different modes of regulation and 
coordination of market activities seeks, in this context, to trace the dominant mechanisms 
of political, institutional and market governance.  
 
Any political economy of social policy of transition societies is therefore faced with the 
somewhat paradoxical co-existence of rapid, radical and irreversible systemic change on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, the continued impact of legacies of the past which, in 
often unexpected ways, continue to structure and even subvert reform agendas. Whilst 
political elites have sometimes viewed neo-liberal reform in parts of the region as a 
necessary means of breaking with the communist past (Horowitz, 2006), this has been very 
uneven and complex with many hybrid forms of political economy emerging not easily 
classified as either neo-liberal or social democratic, with the range of state forms, in the 
context of new nation-state building projects, and varieties of economic systems, also 
varying considerably and resisting easy labelling. 
 
Since the path-breaking work of Hall and Soskice (2001) on varieties of capitalism (VoC), 
the study of types of contemporary market-based production systems has witnessed an 
exponential growth of publications.2 The edited volume by Hall and Soskice (2001) 
identified not simply crucial institutional complementarities of the capitalist system, but 
also important comparative institutional advantages. These have, in turn, shed light on the 
economic vulnerabilities that each different variety of capitalism entails (Scharpf and 
Schmidt, 2000). Challenging a growing assumption regarding convergence towards an 
emergent “global capitalism” (Burawoy, 2001), the VoC approach has shown how 
contemporary capitalist models vary greatly in terms of the coordination of market actions. 
In the literature, overwhelmingly concentrating on relatively long-standing and stable 
capitalist systems, this is usually presented as a continuum with liberal market economies 
(LMEs) on one side and coordinated market economies (CMEs) on the other. In LMEs the 
state adopts a classical laissez-faire approach, avoiding intervening in economic actions, 
preferring to leave these to market forces. In this variety of capitalism, welfare institutions 
play only a residual role in poverty reduction, with limited state interventions in social 
                                                 
2 For a review, see debate in Socio-Economic Review (2009). 
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protection. In CMEs, by contrast, the state takes a more active role in economic regulation, 
influencing the actions of market actors through a variety of economic, monetary and fiscal 
policies. There is also a more active welfare state responsible for extensive skills production 
and social reproduction. The establishment of a well-functioning skills production regime 
represents for CMEs a vital institutional complementarity able to provide important 
comparative institutional advantages to the capitalist system.  
 
Recently, the classic VoC approach has been adapted to analyse more systematically the 
role of the state and of state-like actions in influencing specific patterns of market 
production and coordination. Schmidt (2009), in particular, has identified a third variety 
of capitalism which she terms a state-influenced market economy (SIM), typical of France 
and Italy. Here, the state plays a much more active role than in ideal-typical LMEs or even 
CMEs. Schmidt’s conceptualization is theoretically relevant and useful for this study, albeit 
requiring some amendments, not least since her studies are also confined to relatively 
stable, historically long-standing, advanced capitalist regimes. Crucially, her approach 
brings the state back in, and also addresses state-like actions, notably including the role of 
international organisations, in the analysis of political economy. This is of vital importance 
in the region with which we are concerned where emergent states tend to share sovereignty 
with international organisations. For Schmidt’s “discursive institutionalism”, taking the 
state seriously means considering it in all its complexity, not only in terms of the 
institutional context, but also in terms of policy, polity, and politics. In the process, she 
strikes a balance between path dependency and path creation, continuing to emphasise the 
importance of institutions, self-reinforcing mechanisms and historical legacies (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005), whilst not neglecting the balance of political and social forces (Lane, 2007) 
and change as a result of particular strategies (Cook, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; 
Cerami and Vanhuysse, 2009). 
 
 
3 Varieties of Capitalism in Transition:  
The Making of Post-communist Political Economies 
 
Thus far, the main focus of political economy analysis has been on Western post-industrial 
societies, emphasising positive and negative externalities (see, for instance, Amable 2003). 
There is emerging analytical work on identifying the key drivers of economic and social 
progress in post-communist countries, although much of the literature on post-communist 
countries in transition is still overly empirical and rather descriptive, concentrating more on 
outcomes and on a wide range of social indicators. When there has been analysis of the 
region, this has tended to concentrate only on the Central and Eastern European sub-
region (cf. Bohle and Greskovits, 2007; King, 2007; Lane and Myant, 2007; Nölke and 
Vliegenthart, 2009). Often such studies have adopted a rather Western-centric perspective, 
analysing performance in terms of convergence to Western models of democracy, of 
production and redistribution of wealth, and of welfare regimes. When the region as a 
whole is addressed, the literature has overemphasised country-specific peculiarities and the 
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diversity of national economic, political and institutional structures, often failing to 
produce any clear and systematic categorisation of key characteristics (Hancké, Rhodes and 
Thatcher, 2007; Lane and Myant, 2007; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2010) or the important 
differences that exist among closely related countries (for a notable exception, see Inglot, 
2008). 
 
Adaptation of a VoC approach to countries in transition from socialism and communism 
necessitates a more complex and provisional labelling of emerging political economies. New 
labels abound here, with Shkaratan (2007) and Hanson and Teague (2007) defining the 
Russian Federation as a new form of “etacratism” or of “political capitalism”, whereas Lane 
(2008), emphasising political coordination, labelled it as “state influenced capitalism”. 
Mykhnenko (2007) has described Ukraine as “social market regulated capitalism”, while 
Charman (2007) has defined Kazakhstan as a “state-led liberalized market economy”. 
Other more general classifications have also included the Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher 
(2007) definition of post-communist capitalisms as “emerging market economies” (EMEs) 
or the Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) definition of “dependent market economies”. The 
recent and highly influential work of Bohle and Greskovits (2007) has divided the Central 
and Eastern European region into three substantially different sub-clusters, depending on 
the degree of convergence towards a neo-liberal model. These correspond to a “neo-liberal” 
type in the Baltic States, an “embedded neo-liberal” type in the Visegrad states, and a “neo-
corporatist” type in Slovenia (see also Lendvai, 2009). In terms of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Deacon (1992) described Poland as a “post-communist conservative corporatist” 
welfare state, Czechoslovakia as a “social democratic” model, while Hungary was seen as a 
“liberal welfare regime” (see also Ferge, 2001). For Aidukaite (2006, 2010), Cerami (2006) 
and Żukowski (2009), the ten new Eastern EU member states can be described in terms of 
a distinct post-communist welfare regime type, while for Szalai (2005), Gans-Morse and 
Orenstein (2006) and Fuchs and Offe (2009), a mixture of corporatism and liberalism or 
of corporatism and social democracy (Fenger, 2007) is the main characteristic of these 
countries. Other more diversified categorisations also exist. For Szikra (2004), Tomka 
(2004), Bakken (2008), Sirovátka and Saxonberg (2008) and Hacker (2009), a hybrid mix 
of neo-liberalism, corporatism and social democracy is a key feature in this region, which 
crystallises in a variety of different and not easy to identify forms (see Table 1). 
 
The analyses conducted by these authors have clear merits, but tend to highlight only 
particular characteristics of a more variegated pattern of political and economic decision-
making and governance. On the basis of the considerations above, it is possible to sketch 
more complex patterns of state and of state-like actions occurring in different sub-regional 
clusters. Deriving from Schmidt’s work (2009: 526), we complement the existing literature 
on capitalism in the region with a more in-depth examination of data provided by the 
Institutional Profile Database (IPD) (de Crombrugghe et al., 2009). Here, we examine the 
influence of political institutions – expressed in terms of market coordination and 
regulation – against key institutional variables, such as the free operation of markets, 
coordination of stakeholders and strategic vision, security of transactions and contracts, 
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market operation and social dialogue, openness to the outside world, functioning of the 
public administration, security law and order and social cohesion. In addition, we also 
explore the relation existing between the free operation of markets and social cohesion, 
finding almost no positive correlation (see Figure 1). 
 
Table 1  Post-communist Welfare Capitalisms 
Author Countries Main Approach 
Shkaratan (2007) Russian Federation: etacratism 
VoC* (political 
economy) 
Hanson and Teague (2007) Russian Federation: political capitalism 
VoC (political 
economy) 
Lane (2008) Russian Federation: state influenced capitalism 
VoC (political 
economy) 
Mykhnenko (2007) Ukraine: social market regulated capitalism 
VoC (political 
economy) 
Charman (2007) 
Kazakhstan: state-led liberalized market 
economy 
VoC (political 
economy) 
Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher (2007) 
Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland and Slovakia: 
post-communist capitalisms as emerging 
market economies (EMEs) 
VoC (political 
economy) 
Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) 
Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland and Slovakia: 
dependent market economies 
VoC (political 
economy) 
Myant and Drahokoupil (2010) 
Central and Eastern Europe, former Soviet 
Union: diversified national welfare regimes 
VoC (political 
economy) 
Bohle and Greskovits (2007), Lendvai 
(2009) 
Central and Eastern Europe: neo-liberal type in 
the Baltic States, embedded neo-liberal type in 
the Visegrad states, and neo-corporatist type in 
Slovenia 
VoC (political 
economy) 
Deacon (1992), Ferge (2001) 
Poland: post-communist conservative 
corporatist welfare state; Czechoslovakia: social 
democratic model; Hungary: liberal welfare 
regime 
Welfare regime (social 
protection) 
Aidukaite (2006, 2009, 2010), 
Cerami (2006), Żukowski (2009) 
Central and Eastern Europe: unique post-
communist welfare regime 
Welfare regime (social 
protection) 
Szalai (2005), Gans-Morse and 
Orenstein (2006), Fenger (2007), 
Fuchs and Offe (2009) 
Central and Eastern Europe: a mixture of 
corporatism and liberalism or of corporatism 
and social democracy 
Welfare regime (social 
protection) 
Szikra (2004), Tomka (2004), 
Haggard and Kaufman (2008), Inglot 
(2008), Bakken (2008), Sirovátka 
and Saxonberg (2008), Cerami and 
Vanhuysse (2009), Hacker (2009) 
Central and Eastern Europe: hybrid regimes 
Welfare regime (social 
protection) 
Cook (2007, 2010a), Frye (2010) 
Central and Eastern Europe, former Soviet 
Union: diversified national welfare regimes 
Welfare regime (social 
protection) 
Deacon and Stubbs (2007) 
South Eastern Europe: diversified sub-regional 
welfare regimes 
Welfare regime (social 
protection) 
 
Note: * VoC stands for varieties of capitalism. 
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Figure 1  Political Institutions and Market Coordination 
  
  
  
  
 
Sources: de Crombrugghe et al. (2009), authors’ calculations. 
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State-Enabled Market Economies 
 
We define the EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States 
(namely, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia in our 
sub-sample) as state-enabled market economies characterised by a mix of market-enabling 
state interventions and policy-making (Cerami, 2006; Aidukaite, 2006; Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2007; Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007; Lane and Myant, 2007; Fuchs and 
Offe, 2009; Golinowska, Hengstenberg and Żukowski, 2009; Lendvai, 2009; Nölke and 
Vliegenthart, 2009; Żukowski, 2009). These post-communist states have leaned towards a 
laissez-faire approach to economic growth combined with policies to promote social 
cohesion. The actions of state and state-like actors, notably the EU, the World Bank and 
the IMF, have tended to result in a mixture of an enabling and liberal state (Ferge, 2001; 
Bohle and Greskovits, 2007; King, 2007; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009), in which 
pressures for regulation and de-regulation have combined in somewhat contradictory and 
paradoxical forms. The precise location of each country varies in terms of the propensities 
of ruling coalitions (Cook, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; see also Iversen and 
Soskice, 2006; Manow, 2009), with Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia having moved closer to a 
liberal state form and more explicitly than in Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and 
Poland implementing neo-liberal policies with less of an emphasis on social cohesion 
(Bohle and Greskovits, 2007). In this group of countries, there is clear evidence of an 
export-led foreign direct investments growth model (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2  Share of Trade in GDP (in %) (2008) 
 
 
Sources: EBRD (2009), authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3  Foreign Direct Investments as Percentage of GDP (2008) 
 
 
Sources: EBRD (2009), authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Despite successes facilitated by EU membership, in terms of increasing trade with other EU 
member states, this political economy approach to transition has made the countries in this 
sub-region particularly vulnerable to changes in foreign demand, as well as to the economic 
performance of those countries which constitute primary export markets. The global 
financial crisis has made these economic vulnerabilities even more apparent. Since October 
2008, a drastic diminution of exports and foreign direct investments from the West has, in 
fact, occurred (World Bank, 2009a) and this has contributed to the emergence of serious 
currency crises and to a substantial increase in poverty and income inequality, but not yet, 
particularly in Central Europe, we would argue, to a significant erosion of social protection 
systems as a key set of institutional complementarities. 
 
 
State-Influenced Market Economies 
 
The countries of South Eastern Europe (namely, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Serbia) are, in this context, defined as state-influenced 
market economies characterised by a mix of influencing state actions and neo-liberal laissez-
faire. The state does not always act here as a neutral site but, rather, often acts in favour of 
particular elites, with a degree of clientelism in terms of the allocation of privileges in 
return for political support. This can take the form of “institutional particularism” familiar 
in the study of Southern European welfare regimes (Ferrera, 2000), involving the allocation 
of jobs based on party affiliation and the distribution of benefits according to political 
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loyalties. There is a rather wide range within this group, with many processes radically 
unfinished but, paradoxically, less influenced by routine electoral processes (see Deacon 
and Stubbs, 2007; Stambolieva and Dehnert, 2011). For this group of countries, the 
legacies of the past are particularly strong, especially in the context of still unresolved 
nationalist and ethnicised disputes, notably in Croatia and Serbia following the wars of the 
Yugoslav succession. An important characteristic of these countries also concerns the 
delocalisation of small-size enterprises as well as the creation of a regional export market 
largely reliant, except for the new EU member states of Bulgaria and Romania, on trade 
within the South Eastern European region itself. This can be explained in terms of Tito’s 
legacy of a federal Yugoslavia and the new regulatory frame of the revised CEFTA (Stubbs, 
2009). In this case, the growth model is still led by remittances and donor assistance both 
in the EU member states and non-member states (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). Whilst it 
could be argued that these countries’ recent growth has been fuelled by exports and foreign 
direct investments, the problems in South Eastern Europe have primarily been linked to 
the fact that trade has narrowly been focused and foreign direct investments have been 
concentrated in some sectors at the expense of others (World Bank, 2009a). Again, the 
political economy model embraced by these countries has tended to be particularly 
vulnerable to external economic shocks, such as the global crisis (Stubbs et al., 2009). It has 
depended on the amount of donor assistance that donor countries have been able to offer, 
and on the amount of remittances that migrant workers have been able to send home. 
 
Figure 4  Remittances as Percentage of GDP (2007) 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2009b). 
 
 
 
 17 
Figure 5  Donor Assistance as Percentage of GNI (2008) 
 
 
Sources: World Bank (2009c), authors’ calculations. 
 
 
State-Interfered Market Economies 
 
The countries of the former Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) are quite differentiated in terms of 
their political, economic and social structures. Despite differences within the region, a key 
feature that unites these states is the presence of more autocratic forms of government 
(Bunce, McFaul and Stoner-Weiss, 2009) that do not simply enable or influence the market 
(see Shkaratan, 2007; Hanson and Teague, 2007; Lane, 2008; Frye, 2010; Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2010), but that interfere with it, often creating significant distortions 
(sometimes also referred to as “crony capitalism”; see Sharafutdinova, 2011). These are, in 
some ways, more institutionalised in governance structures than in South Eastern Europe 
(both EU and non-EU). In these countries, there are also tensions between more liberal 
policy-making in the market and a more authoritarian style of decision-making in the 
political environment which tend to become solidified at the levels of politics, polity and 
policy. In terms of state-like actions, especially during the first period of transition (1989-
2000), international actors have greatly influenced the patterns of welfare state 
development in these countries, fostering rapid and uncontrolled de-regulation and 
privatisation of provisions (Orenstein, 2008; Orenstein, Bloom and Lindstrom, 2008). In 
the second period of transition, after 2000, new forms of state-dirigisme have emerged, 
which, in many cases, have resulted in openly nationalist and protectionist policies. Forms 
of clientelism are deeply embedded, with a fusion of political and economic elites in many 
cases, with social welfare providers becoming “brokers for themselves”, with services subject 
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to “spontaneous privatisation” and “shadow commercialisation” (Cook, 2010b). In terms 
of political economy of social policy, the oil producer countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Russian Federation and Uzbekistan have embraced an oil-led growth model which has 
made them particularly dependent on oil and gas exports as well as on high oil and energy 
prices (see Figure 6 and Figure 7; see also World Bank, 2009a). An “oil-led political 
economy” has, in fact, been the main characteristic of the “Russian miracle” in recent years 
(Cerami, 2009), and this has also influenced existing social policies in the countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. In this picture, a special case must be made for the 
donor assistance-remittance dependent non-oil producer countries of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova and Ukraine (see Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6; see also Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2010). These countries have developed not simply an excessive dependence 
on imports of oil, primarily from the Russian Federation (bilateral dependence), but also, 
in some cases, on migrant remittances and on donor assistance (multilateral dependence). 
In terms of the dependence on oil and gas, these countries have become particularly 
vulnerable to the possibilities of buying these natural resources at the lowest possible prices, 
with clear repercussions for their political independence. In this context, sustained 
economic growth has depended not simply on the possibility of the migration of workers, 
but also on the acceptance in the host country of these migrant workers.  
 
Figure 6  Exports of Mineral Fuels, Oils, Distillation Products, etc. as Percentage of GDP (2007) 
 
 
Sources: International Trade Centre (2009), World Bank (2009c), authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
Figure 7  Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) 
 
 
Sources: Energy Information Administration (2009), authors’ calculations. 
 
 
4 Post-communist Welfare and Elite Capture 
 
On the basis of the analysis thus far, in this section we discuss the notion of elite capture of 
welfare systems, as a key concept in terms of the importance of political agency in welfare 
state transformations. Our emphasis is on country-specific patterns of political decision-
making allied with associated market-distorting and redistribution-distorting mechanisms. 
Countries vary in terms of the nature, form and coverage of social protection systems and, 
crucially, the extent to which access to social protection is captured and distorted. This in 
turn impacts how different economies perform, so that it can be seen as both a cause and 
effect of the nature of dominant political economies. It is, of course, widely recognised that 
social welfare systems and social protection frameworks are a product of institutional 
structures, political practices and the drivers of political economy, which create or limit 
opportunities for development (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001; Hemerijck, 2010). By 
providing important comparative institutional advantages to the capitalist system (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), welfare institutions play, in this context, a central role in both social and 
economic reproduction (Esping-Andersen, 1990), subsequently influencing the political 
economies of social policy themselves. They do not simply cushion the adverse effects of 
negative economic performances, but they also support economic growth and economic 
and social progress. In the classical literature on varieties of capitalism, education and 
training are taken as the most notable examples of how different investments in different 
welfare arrangements can foster or hinder economic and social progress (see Estevez-Abe, 
Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Cerami, 2008; Iversen and Stephens, 
2008).  
 
 20 
In fact, more than twenty years of transition have witnessed growing and solidified sub-
regional disparities in terms of the extent and nature of inequality, poverty and social 
exclusion (World Bank 2009a). Whilst the first wave of transition had high social costs 
throughout the CEE-CIS region, later patterns appear to have been structured largely in 
terms of sub-regional political economies, influenced by: legacies, the nature of reform 
paths (gradualist, shock therapy or limited/non-reform), the kinds of institutional 
complementarities that have been built (or not), dominant political discourses, elite (and 
middle class) practices, and patterns of political struggle (Cerami and Vanhuysse, 2009). 
Whilst inequality, poverty and social exclusion are different from each other, they are 
clearly closely related, not least in terms of their linkage to processes of production and 
reproduction and the nature of the political management of the economy, with important 
effects on the citizens’ well-being and happiness.3 
 
Going more into details, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) have 
developed systems of social protection that are marked by considerable variation in terms of 
whether they offer a residual or comprehensive (see Aidukaite, 2006; Inglot, 2008; Cerami 
and Vanhuysse, 2009), sometimes “premature” (Kornai, 1980), social protection system, 
and whether they are marked by a generally non-polarised or non-captured form of access 
to benefits. These considerations involve old-age pensions, but also protection against 
unemployment and against employment-related injuries, access to health care, to means-
tested benefits, to family policies, to maternity leave, and so on. Overall, these models 
display both path-dependent as well as path-breaking characteristics, in terms of their 
institutional context and political and electoral exigencies. However, whilst the main 
drivers of political economy and, indeed, economic vulnerabilities are broadly similar 
throughout the region, the nature of welfare legacies and the broad span of dominant 
political ideas on welfare differ considerably (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Inglot, 2008). 
Crucially, there is no structural or political capture of social welfare although a mixture of 
Bismarckian social insurance and Europeanized active inclusion policies can be seen as 
acting together to support those in work or with a strong contributions record at the 
expense of a non-working or low contribution sector (Cerami, 2006). Whilst the economic 
and financial crisis has reduced fiscal space to an extent in Central Europe, its impacts have 
been more dramatic in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, compounded by 
significant declines in foreign direct investments and in exports, alongside problems in the 
banking sectors. In addition, whilst there is a degree of formal and informal marketization 
of services, in much of these countries only a small elite have opted out of public services, 
with the middle class still tending to both utilise, and vote for, public services. At the same 
time, an enabling state has facilitated and, on the whole, regulated fairly an emerging group 
of not-for-profit non-state providers adhering to quality standards. In a sense, the tensions 
in the region are in terms of striking a balance between a more traditional European social 
model marked by universalism, a mix of insurance-based and direct state spending on social 
                                                 
3 For an extensive review, see Selezneva (2011). 
 21 
welfare, and significant redistribution, on the one hand, and a “race to the welfare bottom” 
in terms of low taxes, flexible labour markets, low wages, targeted social protection and 
minimal redistribution, on the other hand (cf. Vaughan-Whitehead, 2003).  
 
By contrast, the emergent democracies of South Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Serbia) can be portrayed as more 
intermediate and mixed, with a similar range from residual to comprehensive, albeit with a 
tendency towards residual and captured or distorted models (Deacon and Stubbs, 2007). 
The nature of capture varies significantly in this case, although a significant issue in Croatia 
and Serbia relates to privileged treatment of war veterans and those disabled by war, as well 
as the cumulative effects of exclusionary and ethnicised models of citizenship and/or of 
entitlement. These countries are in the process of Europeanization of their social protection 
systems so that patterns of protection and coverage may come to resemble those of their 
CEE (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) neighbours over time. Important to note here is that distortions caused by 
legacies are less easy to erode in this sub-region and are also less subject to exigencies of 
electoral cycles (cf. Deacon and Stubbs, 2007; Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2009). The reason for 
this primarily lies in the more complex patterns of decision-making present in these 
countries, which is often still framed along highly conflictual political and ethnic dividing 
lines. In some cases, the party which secured independence, with close links with the 
military and with economic elites benefiting from privatisation, continues to operate in 
terms of rent-seeking. In other settings, ethnicised elites redistribute resources based on 
ethnicised, rather than territorial, citizenship claims. In terms of South Eastern 
Europe/non-EU (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia) what is most 
notable is the unevenness of reform across sectors, with widespread liberalization in terms 
of labour markets, more diversity in terms of pension systems, little effective health service 
reform, and the rather late influence of the EU on more long-standing poverty reduction 
and social reconstruction agendas (Deacon, Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007). In these countries, 
affected by war and conflict in the 1990s, a post-conflict social development and 
reconstruction frame cuts across traditional social policy typologies. In terms of governance, 
the complexities of state fragmentation and (unfinished) state building in the region have 
led to a blurring between domestic and international actors in parts of the sub-region. 
Europeanization of social welfare is in evidence, particularly in the EU member states and 
candidate countries but even wider in terms of a cognitive shift towards a focus on social 
inclusion. However, this process is cut across by significant supra-national agency 
competition and by a complexity of strategic interests and alliances (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 
2009), coupled with the continued impetus provided by a clientelistic fusion of political 
and economic elites. The former Yugoslav legacy of the region is important in terms of the 
early establishment of statutory social work services and, in parts of the region, the legacy of 
Bismarckian social insurance (at least for industrial workers) is also important. There is 
evidence of growing sub-national inequalities and particular disparities between capital 
cities and other urban areas and rural regions. Social policies are often captured in post-war 
areas in part as a result of politicization of war veterans and, in parts of the region, 
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pensioners are also a powerful political lobby. The significance of remittances and donor 
assistance, combined with large-scale (often forced) migration, the existence of ethnicised 
pockets of “enclave welfare”, and dual residence in different states, all promote a kind of 
delinkage between classical citizenship and welfare entitlement.  
 
In this picture, the highly diversified region of the former Soviet Union is characterised by 
largely residual and highly captured systems of social protection, in which not simply 
protection and coverage are drastically limited, but also access to welfare benefits is 
polarised and permits the existence of more substantial special privileges, alongside 
informalised protection for non-privileged groups (Manning and Tikhonova, 2004; Cook, 
2007, 2010b; Cerami, 2009). As elucidated by the supporters of the “resource curse 
hypothesis”,4 the presence of natural resources and its negative impact on market 
mechanisms here plays a determinant role. In the oil-rich states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Russian Federation and Uzbekistan, there has been a recent move to more comprehensive 
social protection but this, as noted above, remains highly volatile. In the donor assistance-
remittance dependent non-oil producers of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Ukraine, a 
slightly less captured economy and redistribution of resources also occurs, but the extent of 
acquisition and redistribution of resources continues, however, to be subject to limited 
political contestation (Frye, 2010; Spoor, 2010). In some ways, the social welfare and social 
protection systems in these countries are even more radically unfinished than in South 
Eastern Europe, with the fiscal space which oil revenues create being highly volatile. In 
much of this sub-region, old Soviet legacies have either been dismantled or faced chronic 
underfunding, although some continue to be present in the welfare system, notably 
captured by privileged groups such as war veterans, the police and sections of the political 
elite. Memories of Soviet social protection structures continue to influence, albeit in 
complex ways, current discourses of welfare, often in the context of the absence of 
normalised systems of interest representation. Captured or privileged social policy 
combines with elite rent-seeking and elite flight, for a small group of the population, whilst 
much of the rest of the population rely on “informal” welfare (Cook, 2007) with public 
services underfunded, increasingly marketized, and with considerable inequalities in access 
and outcomes. The greatest diversity in terms of social protection and welfare is, however, 
to be found amongst the non-oil-rich countries of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and 
Ukraine which have little in common with one another other than their dependence on oil 
and being successor states of the former Soviet Union. Many features of these countries’ 
social protection systems are similar to those listed above in terms of ambiguous relations to 
a Soviet legacy, namely elite capture within a broad set of privileges, combined with a 
reliance on informal sectors for the majority of the population (Cook, 2007, 2010a; Frye, 
2010). The role of international organisations varies in these countries depending on the 
underlying political complexion of the government, the nature of internal crises and, 
                                                 
4 According to the supporters of the “resource curse hypothesis”, the presence of natural resources, such as oil and gas, can 
hinder economic growth and democracy of a country through a variety of different means. These include political 
corruption, clientelism, low development in agricultural and service sectors, and so on (for a recent discussion, see Ross, 
2001; Haber and Menaldo, 2011). 
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crucially, levels and extent of poverty. International financial institutions and, to an 
increasing extent, the European Union have started to be influential. The European 
Union’s interest here has, thus far, been rather more geopolitical than social but this may 
slowly change and there may be more focus on Europeanized conceptions of social 
inclusion in the future. Important to note here is that international financial institutions 
and some key bilateral development agencies, notably USAID, have tended to work with 
political elites in parts of the sub-region to create a rather extreme variant of a liberal or 
neo-liberal market economy whilst leaving elements of elite rent-seeking and privilege 
astonishingly intact. A recent study on social exclusion throughout the region found 
significantly higher levels of exclusion in Kazakhstan and Moldova, compared to the 
Ukraine, suggesting that the interplay between political and economic factors are highly 
complex and, also, mediated through the actions of political elites (UNDP, 2011).  
 
 
5 Conclusions: Why Institutions and Political Agency Matter 
 
This article has briefly explored the main political economy models and welfare regime 
typologies that have emerged in post-communist countries since the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
In the different sections, we have attempted to sketch the actions of political elites in the 
market and discussed notions of state-enabled, state-influenced and state-interfered market 
economies. By highlighting the drivers and economic vulnerabilities in the global economy 
(Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000), we have attempted to outline the modes of insertion in the 
global economy and also the ways in which these have determined the scope for welfare 
interventions. In the specific context of post-communist transition, we have also 
introduced the notion of “captured welfare systems” to refer to the interferences that states 
and political elites engage in the market, as well as to their actions in capturing and 
redistributing resources. These are dominant in constructing the architecture of emerging 
post-communist worlds of welfare capitalism. In the course of this article, what we have 
tried to emphasise is not simply that institutions matter, but also political agency. As has 
been discussed, political actors in these countries have put in place different mixes of state-
enabling, state-influencing and state-interfering market strategies with associated different 
forms of elite captured regimes. Important political leaders in post-communist countries, 
such as Balcerowicz in Poland, Orbán in Hungary, Tuđman in Croatia, Milošević in 
Serbia, Putin in Russia, Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, or Yushchenko in Ukraine, to name 
only a few, have been far from neutral actors in the process of institutional transformations, 
succeeding, during their time in government, to promote, on the one hand, their specific 
political ideas and discourses to the masses, while, on the other, to give a particular imprint 
to the system of social protection of their respective countries. This has then had important 
repercussions for the set of vested interests established, and for the ways these interests have 
been defended by political elites in the political arena, challenged by citizens in the squares, 
ultimately affecting the creation of different worlds of welfare capitalism. Transition from 
communism to free market economies has not been a neutral or painless exercise, but it has 
involved the materialization of clear winners and losers of transition. The former 
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correspond to those elites who managed to turn their previous political capital into 
economic capital (King and Szelényi, 2004), while the latter have usually corresponded to 
the rest of the population. Together with Frye (2010), we support, therefore, the thesis that 
both institutions and politics matter in shaping the patterns of political polarisation of a 
country, but we emphasise also the fact that this has a lot to do with the specific actions of 
specific political agents situated at the various levels of national and international decision-
making. These actors (both national and international) should, in fact, be seen not as silent 
receivers of institutional norms and rules, but, rather, as important institutional modifiers 
able to influence the institutional set-up of a country (in more or less democratic ways) and 
to promote specific social reform programmes and policies at the expense of others (see 
Schmidt, 2008, 2010; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). Moreover, in line with Häusermann 
(2010), we argue that the process of welfare reforms in post-communist countries also 
involves the emergence of new and not yet resolved cross-cutting lines of political conflicts 
between those with access to resources and those reliant on the redistribution of such 
resources. This results in governments in post-communist countries engaging in diverse 
strategies of political exchange and coalition-building, which materialize along still unclear 
new cross-class coalitions and in terms of variegated reform packages. These arguments set 
a path for future research on post-communist countries, in which not only historical 
legacies and path dependencies are examined, but also the actions of political agents are 
carefully investigated.  
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